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Abstract
It is argued that the usual postulates of quantum mechanics are too
strong. It is conjectured that it is possible to interpret all experiments if
we maintain the formalism of quantum theory without modification, but
weaken the postulates concerning the relation between the formalism and
the experiments. A set of postulates is proposed where realism is insured.
Comments on Bell´s theorem are made in the light of the new postulates.
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I. Introduction
After the discovery of quantum mechanics a warm debate took place
about its interpretation, but since 1927 the Copenhagen interpretation (CI),
due to Bohr, dominated in the scientific community and the debate almost
ceased, although a few critical voices remained like Einstein and Schro¨dinger
(see1 for reprints of the relevant papers of that period). But it is interesting
that the CI was not understood in the same way by different people. In par-
ticular Bohr did not attempt to apply quantum mechanics to the macroscopic
domain, whilst von Neumann did it,2 and even made a model of measurement
on this basis. The debate reappeared with Bohm’s work in 1952 and, with
more strength, after Bell’s paper in 19643 and it lasts until today. In the
last few decades the CI has been progresively abandoned and the so-called
many worlds interpretation (MWI) is taken its place, specially amongst cos-
mologists on the one hand and workers in quantum information on the other.
I include in MWI the interpretations in terms of decoherence4 or consistent
histories,5 in my opinion they are just (important) elaborations within MWI.
Still, some people claim that no interpretation is really needed.6 The reason
for the variety of interpretations of quantum mechanics is that many predic-
tions of the theory have a paradoxical character, and people have attemped
to solve these paradoxes by different means, without complete success till
now in my opinion.
In my view the first step towards a satisfactory solution of the paradoxes
is to investigate what is the minimal set of postulates of quantum mechanics
which are really indispensable for the interpretation of observations and ex-
periments. In some sense this approach is what the CI attempted and it is
close to the ”no-interpretation” above mentioned.6 However, at a difference
with the merely instrumentalist (pragmatic, sometimes named positivistic)
character of the CI, I propose including the requirement that quantum me-
chanics is universal and realistic. By universal I mean that quantum mechan-
ics applies to both the microscopic and the macroscopic domain (although
maybe not to the universe as a whole, see below). This contrasts with the
CI (at least Bohr´s) view that the referent of the theory is always the union
of a microscopic system plus a macroscopic context (including the measur-
ing apparatus), but the macroscopic systems should be treated according to
classical theories.
Realistic means that we assume that physics (or science in general) makes
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assertions about the world and not only about the results of observations or
experiments. In particular this implies that we shall give an ignorance inter-
pretation to the probabilities predicted by the theory, at least the probabili-
ties about properties of macroscopic bodies.
In order to expose my proposal I shall divide this paper in five parts with
the following aims:
1) Pointing out that a part of the postulates of quantum theory are un-
necessarily strong,
2) Analyzing some experiments in order to discover what postulates are
really indispensable,
3) Proposing new postulates leading to a minimal realistic interpretation,
4) Studying the relation with other interpretations: Copenhagen, many
worlds and hidden variables,
5) Showing, with the example of Bell´s theorem, how the conceptual
problems are alleviated.
II. The standard postulates of quantum mechanics
Any theory of physics contains a (mathematical) formalism plus pos-
tulates giving the connection with observations or experiments (semantical
rules). In quantum mechanics the formalism is the theory of Hilbert spaces
combined with relativistic (Lorentz) invariance plus some particular postu-
lates (e.g. masses and coupling constants of elementary particles). (Following
a common practice I shall speak about “quantum mechanics” in the rest of
this article, but I really mean “quantum theory”. Also it is known that
quantum fields cannot be formulated in Hilbert spaces, but require the more
general framwork of C* algebras, but I shall ignore this point of mathematical
rigour).
Most textbooks do not attempt to make precise the connection of the
formalism with the observations or experiments, but we might try to divide
the traditional semantical rules in two classes:
1) The correspondences operators-observables and vectors-states. They
establish that we must associate a vector of an appropriate Hilbert space to
every state of a physical system, and a self-adjoint operator to every observ-
able. This statement alone gives very little information about the connection
of the formalism with the experiments because no mention is made of the
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values of the physical quantities. It should be necessarily complemented with
postulates about the measurement.
2) The theory of measurement, which establish that “when we measure
the observable associated to the operator A in the state with vector (wave-
function) ψ we obtain one of the eigenvalues of A, say aj, with probability
|
〈
ψ | ψj
〉
|2 ”.
It is increasingly obvious that we should not postulate a theory of mesure-
ment. The measurement is just an interaction between some physical system
and a macroscopic apparatus and therefore the study of the measurement
should be derived from the remaining postulates if quantum mechanics is to
be regarded as a fundamental theory of nature. The problem of including the
measurement within the postulates of a theory is that makes it subjective and
ambiguous. Because, what is really a measurement?, at what time is it made
exactly?, a bad experiment, would not give results in disagreement with those
postulated ?. These, and other arguments, have been brillantly exposed by
John Bell, who proposed even the removal of the word “measurement” from
physical theories.3 Nevertheless it is a fact that the relation between opera-
tors and observables in quantum mechanics is always stated with reference
to the possible values which may be obtained in measurements. This fact
contrast with the situation in classical physics, for instance classical statis-
tical mechanics. In that theory we also associate states of physical systems
to some elements of the theory, namely probability distributions in phase
space. Also we associate observables with other elements, namely functions
of the phase space variables. The semantical rules are complete when we
assume that all variables have values simultaneously and give an ignorance
interpretation to the probabilies. But a similar procedure cannot be used in
quantum mechanics as explained in the following.
According to the quantum-mechanical formalism, combined with the stan-
dard correspondence between measurable values of the dinamical variables
and the eigenvalues of the corresponding operators, the variables cannot have
a value when they are not measured. Indeed this is the essential containt of
the Kochen-Specker theorem (see e.g.7 or8). Consequently we cannot make
statements about observables outside the context of a measurement, which
contradicts the desire of removing the theory of measurement. I think that
the existence of several, quite different, interpretations of quantum mechan-
ics derives from that difficulty. CI (Bohr´s) assumes that the connection
formalism-experiments should always involve macroscopic apparatuses which
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must be treated according to classical physics. This implies that macroscopic
variables do possess values independently of measurement, and the postulates
refer to these objective values. John von Neumann´s interpretation (included
in CI by some people) is actually different. It does not attribute values to
macroscopic variables from the start, but assumes that there is a “collapse of
the wavefunction” which objectifies the values (maybe by the action of the
mind or consciousness of a human observer). MWI solves the problem with
an appeal to many branches of the “wavefunction of the universe”, all rele-
vant variables having values in each individual branch. But for me all these
interpretations are unsatisfactory. CI, both Bohr´s and von Neumann´s,
because it establish an “infamous boundary” between the macro and the
microscopic domain (or between matter and mind). MWI because it con-
tains assumptions which cannot be tested empirically and, in addition, look
rather bizarre (a copy of each observer lives in every branch of the universe´s
wavefunction). This is why I am proposing an alternative having elements
of both, CI and MWI, but trying to remove their difficulties.
At this moment a comment of mathematical character is in order. As
is well known, in the standard approach the states of physical systems are
associated to vectors of the Hilbert space and the observables to self-adjoing
operators. Actually a generalization is possible if we associate observables to
normalized positive operator valued (POV) measures .9 On the other hand,
all vectors which are obtained by multiplication of a given vector times com-
plex numbers are assumed to represent the same state. Therefore it is appro-
priate to speak about rays of the Hilbert space rather than about vectors.
Nevertheless, I shall retain the more common, although mathematically less
correct, use of the words vector and operator because here I am putting
the emphasis in the conceptual, philosophical, questions rather than in the
formal, mathematical, ones.
Let us look more closely to the correspondence states-vectors and observ-
ables-selfadjoing operators. They are usually assumed (explicitly or implic-
itly) to be one to one, except for the superselection rules. The one-to-one
character of the states-vectors correspondence is sometimes named super-
position principle and it is enuntiated “if two vectors correspond to states,
any vector which is a linear combination of the former also corresponds to
a state, except for the superselection rules”. Actually if the correspondence
rays-states is one to one, also the correspondence observables-selfadjoing op-
erators is one to one and viceversa. (This result is related to Gleason´s
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theorem7). In my opinion such postulates are unnecessarily strong and even
absurd, because if we assume that every self-adjoint operator represents an
observable, we are making postulates about “what may be measured in prin-
ciple, that is what could be achieved in the laboratory in a more or less distant
future”. I think that the correspondence can be only in one direction, and
so is stated in carefull textbooks. That is, we might assume that for every
possible state which may be found in nature or manufactured in the labora-
tory there is an associated vector, and that for every observable which can
actually be measured there is a self-adjoint operator, but not viceversa. This
may be represented as follows
states 7→ vectors, observables 7→self-adjoint operators.
However, this correspondence is still too strong in my opinion. We should
just admit
states 7→ density matrices, dynamical variables 7→ self-adjoint operators
That is, states should be associated to density operators and only rarely
the density operators would correspond to vectors in Hilbert space, the so-
called pure states . Also we should speak about dynamical variables rather
than observables, because observability is a practical question which should
not be postulated for all dinamical variables. A more precise statement of
the postulates which I propose will be made in section 4, but in order to
motivate them I shall mention a few typical experiments.
III. The interpretation of experiments
In the following I consider some experiments in order to see that rather
weak postulates are indispensable:
1.Static properties of atoms, nuclei, molecules and solids.
Probably the most dramatic qualitative and (modulo some unavoidable
approximations due to the complexity of the calculations) quantitive suc-
cess of quantum theory is the interpretation of the physics of atoms, nuclei,
molecules and solids, in particular their static properties. For instance, the
prediction of the form, size and binding energy of molecules or crystals (hence
their stability), the electric and magnetic properties (if external fields are in-
cluded), etc., is the basis for most of theoretical chemistry and solid state
physics.
In order to get these predictions from quantum mechanics, it is enough
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to take into account the evolution of the Schro¨dinger (or Schro¨dinger-Pauli)
equation for electrons and nuclei, coupled to quantized Maxwell equations
for the electromagnetic field. If we impose appropriate boundary conditions
(e.g. no radiation coming from infinity), we may derive the existence of an
unique stationary state (“the ground state”). Therefore, there is no need to
postulate that the ground state is the eigenstate of the Schro¨dinger equation
with the lowest eigenvalue, this fact following from the formalism. After that,
the solution of the stationary Schro¨dinger equation gives all the required
information, provided we assume that the expectation value of the energy of
the system is given by the standard rule
E = 〈Ψ |H|Ψ〉 ,
where H is the Hamiltonian operator and Ψ the vector state. In particular it is
not necessary to assume that all self-adjoint operators represent observables,
or that all eigenvectors of the Hamiltonian represent physical states. Similar
arguments apply to the static properties of atoms or nuclei.
2. Collisions.
For the study of (elastic or inelastic) scattering it is enough to consider
the evolution of two or more systems (atoms, molecules, nuclei,...), both in
the ground state, which initially are at a macroscopic distance and approach
each other. Aside from the quantum evolution equations plus postulates of
classical physics for the interpretation of the final results, we only need rules
for preparation of the initial state and the interpretation of the final state.
The initial state usually consists of a beam whose preparation may be
described in terms of classical physics (e. g. a macroscopic accelerator).
Hence we should derive the density matrix corresponding to the (usually
microscopic) quantum systems in the incoming beam and the detector. Nev-
ertheless I do not think that it is possible to propose any general postulate
saying how to do that. We should use the method or trial and error with the
only general rule that that the appropriate density matrix is the one havint
the greatest von Neumann entropy compatible with our information. After
that we must use the quantum formalism in order to compute the evolution
of the initial density matrix until the detector. Then we should apply to the
detection process the quantum formalism, which most times could be ap-
proximated by classical equations. At the end we arrive at a density matrix
for the final state of the measuring apparatus. Decoherence theory4 shows
that the apparatus density matrix is, to a very good approximation, diagonal
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in the coordinates representation. That density matrix is interpreted as a
probability distribution (with the ignorance interpretation.) I think that this
is the way how physicists in labs actually interpret the collision experiments.
This interpretation is very good for all practical purposes (FAPP), but
presents a fundamental difficulty (Bell pointed out the important difference
between FAPP and fundamental assertions3). In fact the final density matrix
of the measuring apparatus is only approximately, but not exactly, diagonal.
Therefore either we renounce to the interpretation of its diagonal elements as
true probabilities (this should be the position of MWI) or we break quantum
mechanics at the macroscopic level (this would be the position of CI). My
position departs from both MWI and CI by assuming that quantum mechan-
ics itself is an approximation to a more fundamental theory not yet known.
An extremely good approximation, indeed. I eleborate more on that below.
3. Spectroscopy.
This technique gives rise to the most spectacular agreement between
quantum predictions and experimental results, the precision being sometimes
better than 1 part in 109. This happens, e.g. in atomic spectra with visible
light (electronic transitions) or microwaves (hyperfine transitions). The ex-
periments of atomic spectroscopy are frequently interpreted as measurements
of the energy levels of atoms. However, that interpretation is not necessary
(although some people argu¨e that it is suggested by the formalism). We may
simply assume that we are dealing with the evolution, governed by the quan-
tum equations, of a beam of incoming radiation interacting with a material
system (atom, nucleus, etc.). After all spectroscopy is a particular example
of scattering experiment where a light beam is substituted for the incoming
beam of particles. Both the incoming light and the outgoing light may be
usually treated as classical.
4. Interference.
These experiments are currently taken as the most dramatic examples
of non-classical (quantum) behaviour. Nevertheless we need rather weak
postulates for their interpretation. Again, it is enough to know the initial
state, the evolution (including the interaction of microobjects with macro or
mesoscopic devices like a grating or a detector) and the interpretation of the
final results as in collision experiments (e.g. interpretation of what wee see
in a photographic plate as blackening of grains by the action of the incoming
particles). We do not need to speak about whether a particle goes through
one or both slits.
8
In all these examples we see that the standard postulates about the ex-
istence of discrete energy states, and their correspondence with vectors in
Hilbert space, or about the association of observables with operators, are not
really necessary. This leads us to conjecture that the (mathematical) formal-
ism of quantum mechanics, the standard postulates of macroscopic physics
for the connection formalism-experiments, plus some particular hypotheses
(like the assumption that an atom consists of a nucleus plus electrons) are
sufficient for the interpretation of all experiments.
Of course, for the applications it is more economical to use some “practical
recipes”, like Feynman’s rule of summing probability amplitudes of indistin-
guishable paths in experiments of interference, but summing probabilities
if the paths are distinguishable. The problem is that conceptual difficulties
arise when the practical rules are taken as postulates. For example, the wave-
particle duality appears as highly counterintuitive in experiments showing,
alternatively, recombination and anticorrelation. In a typical experiment10
one sends “individual photons” to a beam-splitter and verifies anticorrelated
detection, that is either the detector in the transmitted beam or the detector
in the reflected beam fires, but not both. This apparently proves the corpus-
cular nature of the photon. However, recombination of the two beams gives
rise to interference, which apparently shows that the photon has gone by both
paths at the same time. The experiment appears as mind boggling because it
cannot be explained either assuming that something travels along both paths
or assuming that there is propagation only along one path. However, there
are alternative interpretations where something real (an electromagnetic field
actually) propagates by the two paths, which explains interference, but some
mechanism prevents the firing of both detectors at the same time, which
explains anticorrelated detection.11
Another crucial point of our proposed approach is that it is not necessary
to postulate the existence of discrete energy states of quantum systems. Such
states may be just mathematical intermediates in the calculation of the evo-
lution. This is the case, for instance, with Fock states of the radiation field
(e.g. single photon states). The states appear as mathematical constructs,
not necessarily representing anything real, and are similar to the Fourier
components in the standard solution of linear partial differential equations.
A typical example of these is the diffusion equation, where the Fourier com-
ponents of the series solution may not be positive definite and this does not
imply that probabilities are negative, because only the sum of the series rep-
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resents a probability. (There is a difference with the Schro¨dinger equation,
however, in the fact that no theorem of positivity exists here, similar to
the theorem stating that the fundamental solution of a diffusion equation is
always positive.)
The moral of our analysis is that the standard postulates of quantum
mechanics (in particular the universal correspondence between vectors and
states) constrains the possible interpretations of quantum mechanics. My
conjecture is that weaker postulates may allow for alternative interpretations
free from conceptual difficulties.
IV. Proposed postulates
Firstly I admit without any change the usual formalism of quantum theory
(Hilbert space, equations of Dirac, Klein-Gordon, Maxwell, etc.)
The postulates of connection with experiments are reduced to:
1) To every physical system we associate a Hilbert space in the standard
form.
2) To every “preparation” we associate a density operator.
A preparation is a set of well specified laboratory manipulations. But
I claim that it is necessary to specify the actual operations and the full
macroscopic context. It is not enough to say, for instance, “I take a pair
of photons of such and such properties”. We should say something like “I
take a crystal of specified kind, cut in such or such form, at which we direct
a laser with specified properties”, etc. That is we should specify the full
macroscopic context. States are defined by the preparation like chemical
species are defined by the recipe for obtaining them in the laboratory (either
extracting them from natural products or by synthesis). Thus I propose that
2’) The density operator corresponding to a preparation is the one having
maximum von Neumann entropy compatible with our knowledge about the
system.
I do not make any distinction between ”pure states” and ”mixtures”,
but claim that we shall treat them on the same footing. I do not assume
that there is a physically realizable state corresponding to every vector in
Hilbert space. In this sense I reject the standard form of the superposition
principle. However the break which I consider for that principle is not of
the ”superselection rule” type, but deeper. My conjecture is that, in most
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cases, physical states will have a positive (nonzero) von Neumann entropy,
pure states being just mathematical constructs. But I do not propose this
condition as a postulate, I want just to remove the postulate that the opposite
is true. In any case I do not assume that ”pure states” provide a complete
information about a single system, but about an ensemble of systems (i. e.
those corresponding to a given preparation procedure). In this sense my
proposal may be classified within the so-called statistical interpretation of
quantum mechanics12
I do not postulate anything about observables (e.g. that the possible
values obtained in a measurement are the eigenvalues of some selfadjoint
operator). But I do not claim that such statements cannot be a part of
the theory, I only claim that all statements of that kind, if true, should be
derived from the remaining postulates. Observable is anything that can be
actually observed (measured). Therefore the observables should be defined by
a specific method of measurement. And measurement is a physical interaction
which should be studied using the remaining postulates of quantum theory.
We should look at the process of measurement as follows. We have a
system prepared in a specified form (that is, in some ”state” represented by
a density operator) and an experimental (macroscopic) context, also repre-
sented by a density operator. Both the system and the context evolve in
interaction until they arrive at a final state. At the end of the measurement
we observe a macroscopic system and this observation does not require spe-
cial postulates (in addition to those of classical physics). Any macroscopic
apparatus is in contact with the environment (it is always an open systems)
and it is possible to prove13 that the evolution gives, after a long enough
time, a reduced density matrix (resulting from taking the partial trace with
respect to the environment) which is diagonal in the coordinates represen-
tation for the macroscopic variables (e.g. the center of mass of macroscopic
bodies).
Finnally we need an objectification postulate, which is required for a realist
interpretation of quantum mechanics. That is we must state what elements
of the theory correspond to elements of reality, in contrast with elements of
the theory which are just mathematical constructs useful for the formula-
tion of the theory. An example of the former is the distance between two
macroscopic bodies, an example of the latter is a vector in a Hilbert space.
For a complete theory it is necessary that every element of physical reality
has a counterpart in the theory, but I do not assume that quantum me-
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chanics is complete.14 Thus I shall not attempt to specify the elements of
the theory which correspond to every element of reality. I shall do that for
some of the elements of reality, namely positions of bodies. Still I do not
want to make claims about the reality of quantum particles, like electrons or
photons. Maybe the said particles are just useful mathematical constructs.
Consequently I shall postulate only the objective reality for the position of
macroscopic bodies, as follows:
3) The center of mass of any macroscopic body, or any macroscopic part of
it, has a definite position in space at every time. The probability distribution
of positions is give by Born´s rule, that is it equals the modulus squared of
the wave function in the position representation.
Certainly this postulate is open to criticism. Firstly the word macro-
scopic has not a sharp meaning. A solution (admittedly not very good)
is to define as macroscopic any system with mass greater than, say, one
microgram. Another possible criticism is that the postulate refers directly to
macroobjects. Now, postulates about macroscopic objects may be derived
from postulates about microobjects, but the inverse process is not trivial.
Therefore finding the consequences of our three postulates for the micro-
scopic domain (the one most properly quantal) may be difficult or impossi-
ble. I am aware of these problems, but in my view they are less dramatic
than the difficulties associated to CI or MWI, as commented above. Also
I suppose that the difficulties of my approach are related to the fact that
quantum mechanics is an approximation of a more fundamental theory. This
is suggested by the fact that the conceptual difficulties are alleviated when
we pass from (elementary) quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. For
instance the stationary states with sharp energy which appear in the solu-
tion of Schro¨dinger equation are rather bizarre, but it is known that the
states are neither stationary nor sharp in energy when the interaction with
the quantized radiation field is taken into account. My conjecture is that
a fundamental theory free from interpretational difficulties will be obtained
only when the unification of quantum field theory and general relativity is
achieved.
Our third postulate implies that the reduced quantum density matrix
of macroscopic variables should be interpreted as a probability distribution.
That is we propose an ignorance interpretation of the density matrix, which
cannot be derived either in the CI or in the MWI. In fact, in both approaches
a fundamental value is attributed to “pure states” of physical systems. They
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correspond to vectors (more correctly rays or, equivalently, idempotent den-
sity matrices) of the Hilbert space, whilst only non-idempotent density ma-
trices are seen as associated to lack of information. As is well known this
leads to the impossibility of objectification as correctly stressed by P. Mit-
telstaedt.9
In my proposal all density matrices representing actual states have an
operational meaning (including those corresponding to rays if any): They
are associated to physically realizable preparations, and they take account of
the actual information that we have about the system. In this sense we leave
open the possibility that the information is incomplete, even about a system
represented by a “quantum pure state”, that is we leave open the possibility of
hidden variables. Furthermore, our objectification postulate requires that the
initial information about the system to be measured is already incomplete,
although I shall not elaborate further on this point in this paper. Another
consequence of the objectification postulate is to view decoherence4 as a
loss of information closely similar to the “coarse graining” which happens in
classical physics when we average over the degrees of freedom which are out
of our control.
In my approach the concept of “state” has an epistemological, rather than
ontological, character. States are rather similar to the probability distribu-
tions (ensembles) used in classical statistical mechanics. They refer to our
knowledge about the system. However, that knowledge has a fundamentally
objective character because it rests upon an objectively defined preparation
procedure. The lack of ontological commitement derives from my rejection of
statements of principle. That is I consider meaningless expressions like “the
maximum information which may be obtained in principle”. The actual
information is what matters.
V. Relation with Copenhagen, many worlds and hid-
den variables interpretations
The approach here presented has some similarities with the CI and also
with the MWI but, at a difference with these, it allows (almost requests) for
hidden variables. Let us analyze in some detail these points.
With the Copenhagen interpretation I share: 1) the emphasis on the need
of speaking always about the macroscopic context, and 2) an operational
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approach to state (preparation) and observable (measurement). Indeed, I
propose to remove all postulates relating directly the elements of the the-
ory (electrons, photons, etc.) with actual physical objects. In this sense
the postulates about the connection formalism-experiments refer always to a
(possibly microscopic) system plus its macroscopic context as in the CI. In
some sense the proposed postulates go farther than Heisenberg, for whom it
is nonsense to speak about trajectories of electrons. The proposed intepre-
tation avoids even assuming from the start that the electron itself (or the
photon, etc.) is a real object, although I do not assume the opposite either.
In the proposed minimal realist interpretation the microscopic entities are
assumed to be “theoretical (human) constructs” useful for the description of
nature at the microscopic level, although they are related to some objective
reality.
However there are three sharp differences between this approach and the
CI: 1) I assume that the formalism of quantum mechanics should be applied
both to micro and to macroscopic bodies, in contrast with CI (at least with
Bohr´s view), 2) I do not exclude the existence of a subquantum level (hidden
variables) which in the future might be accesible to our knowledge, and 3)
related to this is the fact that the proposed interpretation is not considered
the final word, it is just a provisional one to be used until we have a more
fundamental theory.
With the MWI (or relative state interpretation) I share the assumption
of the full validity of the quantum formalism even for the macroscopic world.
However, the objectification postulate implies that the macroscopic variables
always possess values (all macroscopic measurements may be reduced to po-
sition measurements). But the objectification postulate applies to a reduced
density operator, obtained by taking the partial trace with respect to the
environment. Consequently it does not apply to the whole universe, which
has no environment. Also, as mentioned above, I do not postulate any funda-
mental relevance for the “quantum pure states”, which seems to be a (maybe
implicit) assumption of the MWI.
VI. Quantum mechanics and local realism: Bell’s the-
orem.
It seems obvious, at least to me, that the best interpretation of quantum
mechanics would be in terms of local hidden variables, if this were possible.
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(More properly, it would be desirable to have a local realist substitute for
quantum mechanics, in a similar way that general reltivity is a local substi-
tute for Newtonian gravitation. I believe that this was Einstein´s desidera-
tum). Consequently Bell´s theorem is the biggest problem for a satisfactory
interpretation of quantum mechanics. But I claim that local hidden variables
have not yet been excluded by performed experiments (see below.)
The proof of Bell’s theorem requires to assume that there are states such
that: 1) they are physically realizable in the laboratory, and 2) they violate
a Bell inequality . As I do not admit as a postulate of quantum mechanics
the realizability of any particular state, the derivation of the theorem would
involve proving that such state may be produced. That is I demand a detailed
prosposal of an experiment where such state may be manufactured before
a rigorous claim may be made about the incompatibility of local realism
with the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. On the other hand, a
detailed experimental proposal is proved to be truly reliable only when the
experiment is actually made. Consequently no claim of incompatibility may
be made until such experiment is performed.
In the meantime Bell´s is a purely mathematical theorem (purely means
without direct implications for the real world) that shows the incompatibility
between two formalisms: 1) the Hilbert space formalism plus the postulate
that all vectors correspond to states which may be physically realized (except
for the superselection rules), and 2) the Bell formalism for local hidden vari-
ables theories. This does not mean that Bell’s theorem is irrelevant. On
the contrary, I think that it is one of the most important discoveries in the
physics of the 20th century. But its relevance consists of being a guide for
possible experiments able to test quantum theory versus local realism. As is
well known (or rather, it should be well known) no (loophole-free) experiment
has been performed able to refute local realism up to now. It is remarkable
that this happens more than forty years after Bell´s work, which shows that
the empirical disrproof of local realism is not a trivial matter. Actually
the optical photon experiments are unable to truly test the Bell inequalities
due to the detection loophole.15 More suitable seem to be experiments with
atomic qubits. One such experiment has already been performed,16 but it
did not close the locality loophole and presents other difficulties.17
My conjecture is that no experiment will ever refute quantum mechanics.
But I also guess that decoherence and other sources of noise (e.g. quantum
zeropoint fluctuations) might prevent the violation of local realism. That
15
is, I still believe that quantum mechanics and local hidden variables are
compatible, provided we define quantum mechanics with a set of postulates
far weaker than is made usually, in the line shown in this paper.
16
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